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A CRITIQUE OF IN RE BILSKI
By Maayan Filmar'
"[T]he trajectories of culture, economics and
technology have reached a point where a distinction
between idea and machine can no longer be
sustained; where no bulwark of logic, but only the
mist of undecidability, separates E=mc 2 from the
light bulb."2
I. INTRODUCTION
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101 ("section 101"), patent protection is
provided to "whoever invents or discovers any new and useful
process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any
new and useful improvement thereof . . . .,, Industrial age
inventions fell easily into at least one of these four statutory
categories.4 Information age inventions, however, complicate the
analysis under section 101 and blur the boundaries of its
enumerated categories.' A common characteristic of these
information age inventions, namely software and electronic
commerce, is that they are not traditional subjects of patent law.6
1. LL.M. Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, 2009; LL.B. Haifa
University, Israel 2008; B.A. in Economics Haifa University, 2008. The author
gratefully appreciates the helpful comments and the excellent guidance from
Professor Alan Wolf.
2. James Gleick, Patently Absurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12, 2000, at 48
available at http://www.nytimes.com/
library/magazine/home/20000312mag-patents.html.
3. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
4. Stephen Komiczky, The New Landscape of Patentable Subject matter
Under 35 US.C. § 101- Applying an Industrial Age Test to Information Age
Innovations, INTELL. PROP. TODAY, Jan. 2009, at 12 available at
http://www.iptoday.com/articles/2009-1-komickzy.asp?.
5. Id.
6. Jay P. Kesan & Andres A. Gallo, Why "Bad" Patents Survive in the
Market and How Should We Change? The Private and Social Costs of Patents,
55 EMORY L.J. 61, 67 (2006).
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Often times, they are intangible.7  Hence, in light of their
complexity, the Patent Office and the courts struggle to decide
whether and to what extent these inventions deserve the protection
of the Patent Act.8
In 1998, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit radically
changed the landscape regarding software and business method
patents. 9 Its State Street" decision opened the floodgates to
business method and software-related claims." Indeed, according
to the World Intellectual Property Organization's statistical report
from 2008, the annual growth of patent filings in the field of
computer technology between 2001 and 2005 was 5.3%,12 the
highest compared to other fields of technology. 13  This great
increase in filings of software-related patents, however, resulted in
public pressure to make it more difficult to obtain them. 4
Recently, the Federal Circuit took a step away from State
Street's broad interpretation of section 101.15 On October 30,
2008, it decided In re Bilski. 6 The Federal Circuit reconsidered
the scope of section 101 and held the "machine-or-transformation"
test to be the sole test to determine whether a process is patent
7. Komiczky, supra note 4, at 12.
8. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the
United States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 77 (2002).
9. Kristen Osenga, Ants, Elephant Guns, and Statutory Subject Matter, 39
Ariz. St. L.J. 1087, 1089 (2007).
10. State St. Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368
(Fed. Cir. 1998).
11. Lilly He, In Re Bilski En Banc Rehearing on Patentable Subject Matter:
Farewell to Business Method Patents?, 14 B.U.J.SCI. & TECH. L. 252, 253
(2008).
12. WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, WORLD
PATENT REPORT - A STATISTICAL REVIEW 2008 41 (2008), available at
http://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/ipstats/en/statistics/patents/pdf/wipo-pub
_931 .pdf.
13. Id. (Growth rates in other notable fields: medical technology- annual
growth of -2.1%, biotechnology- annual growth of -2.7%, pharmaceuticals-
annual growth of 1.7%, machine tools- annual growth of -0.6%, and civil
engineering- annual growth of 1.5%).
14. See Osenga, supra note 9, at 1091.
15. Komiczky, supra note 4, at 12.
16. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en bane).
[Vol. XX: 1
2
DePaul Journal of Art, Technology & Intellectual Property Law, Vol. 20, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 3
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol20/iss1/3
A CRITIQUE OF IN RE BIL SKI
eligible.'7 As a result, "a claimed process is surely patent-eligible
under section 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or
apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular article into a different
state or thing."18
This article argues that Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test
should not be the test to determine patent-eligibility of process
claims under section 101. As it will demonstrate, Bilski's test is
ambiguous, inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent, and fails
to adequately address the problem courts are really concerned
about: the issuance of "bad" and costly patents. 9 If the Supreme
Court will not abandon this test, trivial and absurd inventions, such
as "a method for swinging on a swing" 2 or a method "for
exercising curious animals, especially pet cats" with a laser
pointer2 1 will continue to be patentable.
Instead of Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test, this article
will suggest returning to the practical, well-established standards
to determine patent-eligibility under section 101: "anything under
the sun that is made by man"2 2 should be patentable, with the
exception of "laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract
ideas."23 Indeed, the subject-matter doctrine is the best mechanism
to address the issues raised by "bad inventions." Under these
standards, section 101 would remain flexible and easily applicable.
To facilitate the application of these limitations to the field of
software, this article will suggest establishing an advisory
committee of software experts that will advise the Patent Office
and the courts as to the patentability of software inventions under
section 101. Consequently, the "gate-keeping" 24 function of
17. Mark C. Scarsi & Blake Reese, Refining (or redefining) Patentability:
Post-In Re Bilski Developments, PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY
(Feb. 4, 2009).
18. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 954.
19. See Peter M. Kohlhepp, Note, When the Invention Is an Inventor:
Revitalizing Patentable Subject Matter to Exclude Unpredictable Processes, 93
MINN. L. REv. 779, 799 (2008).
20. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
21. U.S. Patent No. 6,701,872 (filed Oct. 30, 2002).
22. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
23. Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
24. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579, 597 (1993)
(holding that federal trial judges have a "gatekeeping role" for the admission of
2009]
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section 101 will be successfully preserved.
Part II of this article will provide a short summary of the
majority opinion in In re Bilski and demonstrate its inconsistency
with Supreme Court precedent. Part III will discuss the ambiguity
of Bilski 's "machine-or-transformation" test. Specifically, this part
will demonstrate how both prongs of the test fail to prevent the
issuance of "bad patents." Part IV of this article will discuss the
history of software-related patents. Then, it will analyze three main
characteristics of bad software inventions that justify their
exclusion under section 101: triviality, stifling subsequent
innovation and overbreath. Part V of this article will suggest how
the patent system may successfully prevent the issuance of bad
software patents. In particular, it will suggest establishing an
advisory committee of software experts that will aid both the
Patent Office and the courts in identifying bad software patents.
This article will discuss the legal foundation of this committee and
its members' qualifications and suggest two alternative solutions
to the fundamental problem of confidentiality raised by the use of
such external experts.
II. IN RE BILSK, 545 F.3D 943 (FED. CIR. 2008) (EN BANC).
A. The Majority's Opinion
In re Bilski followed the rejection of the patent application of
Bernard L. Bilski and Rand A. Warsaw ("Bilski") by the Board of
Patent Appeals and Interferences ("the Board").25  Bilski's
invention concerned a method to be utilized by commodity
providers for managing consumption risk associated with the sale
of commodities, such as natural gas or coal, for a given period.26
The Board rejected Bilski's claims on the ground that they did not
scientific evidence). According to the Daubert standard, trial judges must
evaluate proffered expert witnesses to determine whether their testimony is both
"relevant" and "reliable". Id.
25. Exparte Bilski, No. 2002-2257, 2006 WL 5738364 at *1 (B.P.A.I. Sept.
26, 2006).
26. Id.
[Vol. XX: I
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involve any patent-eligible transformation. 27 The Board reasoned
that the transformation of "non-physical financial risks and legal
liabilities of the commodity provider, the consumer, and the
market participants 12 8 was not patent-eligible subject matter. In
addition, the Board held that Bilski's claims preempted "any and
every possible way of performing the steps of the [claimed
process], by human or by any kind of machine or by any
combination thereof,"29 and, therefore, they merely claimed an
abstract idea ineligible for patent protection. Finally, the Board
held that Bilski's process did not produce a "useful, concrete and
tangible result" because it was not a patent-eligible subject
matter. 30
Bilski appealed to the Federal Circuit, which heard the matter en
banc to decide the issue of patentability under section 101 of the
Patent Act. The issue before the Federal Circuit was "what test or
set of criteria governs the determination by the Patent and
Trademark Office ("PTO") or courts as to whether a claim to a
process is patentable under § 101 or, conversely, is drawn to
unpatentable subject matter because it claims only a fundamental
principle."31
To determine whether a claim is tailored narrowly enough to
encompass only a particular application of a fundamental principle
rather than to preempt all future uses of such principle, the Bilski
court established a test: "a claimed process is surely patent-eligible
under § 101 if: (1) it is tied to a particular machine or apparatus, or
(2) it transforms a particular article into a different state or
thing. '3 2 The Federal Circuit held this test to be the sole test to
determine the eligibility of different process claims under section
101.11
The court elaborated two additional corollaries to clarify its
"machine-or-transformation" test. First, it stressed that mere
"field-of-use" limitations are generally insufficient to render an
27. Id. at *18-20.
28. Id. at *18.
29. Id. at *20.
30. Id. at *21-22.
31. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 952.
32. Id. at 954.
33. Id. at 958-961.
20091
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otherwise ineligible process claim patent-eligible, and second, it
explained that insignificant post-solution activities will not
transform un-patentable principles into a patentable processes.34
Finally, the court proceeded to apply the "machine-or-
transformation" test to Bilski's claims. Since Bilski conceded that
his claims were not limited by any specific machine, the court left
the elaboration of this prong of the test to future cases.35
Regarding the second prong of test, the court acknowledged that
physical transformation is not mandatory for compliance with this
prong. Rather, the Federal Circuit held that under its own
precedent,36 transformation of specific data may also suffice so
long as "the claim is limited to a visual depiction that represents
specific physical objects or substances."37 Under these principles,
the court held that Bilski's claims failed to comply with the
transformation requirement of the "machine-or-transformation"
test.38 Reasoning that "purported transformations or manipulations
simply of public or private legal obligations or relationships,
business risks, or other such abstractions cannot meet the test
because they are not physical objects or substances, and they are
not representative of physical objects or substances,"39 the court
rejected Bilski's claims as ineligible under section 101.
34. Id. at 961-963. The first corollary, namely that mere "field-of-use"
limitation is generally insufficient, originates from Gottschalk v. Benson, 409
U.S. 63, 71-72 (1972). The second corollary, namely that insignificant post-
solution activities will not transform un-patentable principles into a patentable
processes, originates from Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 590 (1978).
35. Id. at 962.
36. See In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902 (C.C.P.A. 1982). The court held un-
patentable a broad independent claim reciting a process of graphically
displaying variances of data from average values. Id. at 903. The claim did not
specify any particular type or nature of data and did not specify how or from
where the data was obtained or what the data represented. Id. at 908.
Nonetheless, the court held patentable-eligible one of the claims since it
explained the type of data ("X-ray attenuation data"), how the data was obtained
("produced in a two dimensional field by a computed tomography scanner") and
what it represented (the structure of bones, organs, and other body tissues-
physical and tangible objects). Id. at 908-09.
37. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-963.
38. Id. at 964.
39. Id. at 963.
[Vol. XX: I
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B. Bilski's "Machine-or-Transformation" Test and Supreme
Court Precedent
It appears that Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test is
inconsistent with Supreme Court precedent.4 ° Indeed, the Supreme
Court has never held it to be the sole test for patentable processes
under section 101.41 In fact, the Supreme Court had been always
careful to avoid formulating a bright line rule that would freeze
section 101 to old technologies.42
The majority based its opinion on four prior decisions of the
Supreme Court and particularly upon misinterpretation and
misapplication of a single statement made in dicta in Gottschalk v.
Benson.43 This statement, which provides that "transformation and
reduction of an article 'to a different state or thing' is the clue to
the patentability of a process claim that does not include particular
machines," 4 originated in the Court's Cochrane v. Deener
decision.45 However, Cochrane never held that to be patent-
eligible, a process must result in a physical transformation.46
Cochrane decided whether a process for improving the qualities of
superfine flour could be infringed irrespective of the tools used by
the alleged infringer to achieve the same result of the process.47
The patentee argued that his invention was in the process itself,
and "not limited to any special arrangement of machinery.''48
Thus, the above statement was made in the context of a
40. Erika Amer, Ten Reasons the Supreme Court Should Take In re Bilski,
PATENTLY 0, Apr. 1, 2009, http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2009/04/guest-
post-ten-reasons-the-supreme-court-should-take-in-re-bilski.html.
41. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 978.
42. Christopher A. Harkins, Throwing Judge Bryson's Curveball: A Pro
Patent View of Process Claims As Patent-Eligible Subject Matter, 7 J.
MARSHALL REv. INTELL. PROP. L. 701, 729 (2008). See 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2006).
43. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9, In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), petition for
cert.filed, (U.S. Jan. 28, 2009) (No. 08-964), 2009 WL 559339.
44. Benson, 409 U.S. at 70.
45. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 9.
46. Id. at 10.
47. Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876).
48. Id.
2009]
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mechanical process. 49 Nothing in Cochrane implied that, to be
patent-eligible, every future process must perform a transformation
of a thing into a different state or thing."
Similarly, in Benson, the Supreme Court refused to adopt the
"machine-or-transformation" test as the only test to determine
patent-eligibility of process under section 10 151 The Court stated:
It is argued that a process patent must either be tied
to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate
to change articles or materials to a 'different state or
thing.' We do not hold that no process patent could
ever qualify if it did not meet the requirements of
our prior precedents.52
In so holding, the Court refused to adopt the "machine-or-
transformation" test as the only test to determine patent-eligibility
of process under section 101."3
Furthermore, Bilski's majority holding is also inconsistent with
Parker v. Flook, where the Supreme Court rejected a claim for a
process for calculating alarm limits for use in connection with
catalytic conversion of hydrocarbons. 4 The Court rejected the
invention because it sought to patent a non-patentable law of
nature and not because it failed to comply with the "machine-or-
transformation" test.55  Indeed, Flook assumed "that a valid
process patent may issue even if it does not meet one of these
qualifications of our earlier precedents."56
The Federal Circuit's reliance on the fourth precedent, Diamond
v. Diehr, is also misplaced. 7 Contrary to the majority's statement
that Diehr "once again" applied the "machine-or-transformation"
test in evaluating the patentability of a claimed process,58 Diehr
49. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 10.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
53. Id.
54. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 979.
55. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 11.
56. Flook, 437 U.S. at 589 n. 9 (citing Benson, 409 U.S. at 71).
57. See Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 11-12.
58. Id.
[Vol. XX: I
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merely recognized that a process that transforms an article into a
different state or thing - such as the process of curing raw rubber
considered in that case - illustrates "the types of processes which
have historically been eligible to receive the protection of our
patent laws."59 Nowhere did Diehr suggest that transformation is
required for a process to be patent-eligible under section 101.60
Instead, Diehr emphasized that the only limits to patent eligibility
are those reflected by the three exceptions of "laws of nature,
natural phenomena, and abstract ideas."6'
Accordingly, it appears that none of the four Supreme Court
precedents cited by the Federal Circuit support the holding that a
process is patent-eligible only if it is tied to a machine or it
transforms a particular article into a different state or thing.62
These decisions support a broad interpretation of section 101 and
emphasize that a process will constitute a patent-eligible subject
matter under section 101 so long as it does not recite one of the
three traditional exceptions, namely "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas."63 The majority failed to explain
why the expansive language of section 101 would "preclude
protection of innovation simply because it is not transformational
or properly linked to a machine (whatever that means)"' and
provided no logical explanation as to how the "machine-or-
transformation" test would actually exclude process claims that
embrace one of above three exceptions.65
III. INRE BILSKI INCREASES VAGUENESS AND UNCERTAINTY
The exact contours of the "machine-or-transformation" test are
uncertain.6 6 As Judge Newman, one of three dissenters in Bilski,
stated "uncertainty is the enemy of innovation. These new
uncertainties not only diminish the incentives available to new
59. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 184.
60. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 12.
61. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
62. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 12.
63. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185. See also Flook, 437 U.S. at 589.
64. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1012 (Rader, J. dissenting).
65. Brief of Am. Intell. Prop. Law Ass'n, supra note 43, at 17.
66. Korniczky, supra note 4, at 13.
2009]
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enterprise, but disrupt the settled expectations of those who relied
on the law as it existed."67 Although Bilski formulated an
apparently bright line rule, it failed to provide an adequate
explanation of how the "machine-or-transformation" test would be
implemented.68
A. The Machine-Implementation Prong of the "Machine-or-
Transformation " Test
Bilski left many implementation questions unresolved.69 The
opinion did not address what it means for a process claim to be
tied to a specific machine, and particularly, is the recitation of a
general purpose computer sufficient to satisfy the machine
inquiry?7 ° Another unanswered question is what precisely qualify
as "insufficient post solution activity?"'"
Indeed, when the Federal Circuit in Bilski turned to apply the
"machine-or-transformation" test to Bilski's claimed invention, it
noted that it will "leave to future cases the elaboration of the
precise contours of machine implementation, as well as the
answers to particular questions, such as whether or when recitation
of a computer suffices to tie a process claim to a particular
machine."72
It appears, however, that "the requirement that software be 'tied
to a particular machine or apparatus' will not be satisfied by
merely reciting that the software is tied to a 'general-purpose
digital computer."'73 This assumption was recently affirmed in Ex
parte Halligan, which concerned a claimed invention for a method
or "a programmed computer method" for identifying trade secret
data.74 Although the claim was tied to a computer, the Board held
67. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977.
68. Michael D. Bednarek, et al., In Re Bilski: The Good, The Bad and The
Unanswered- Establishing a Framework for Order in the Patent World, INTELL.
PROP. TODAY, Dec. 2008 at 30 available at http://www.iptoday.com/
articles/2008-12-bednarek.asp.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Korniczky, supra note 4, at 14.
72. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
73. Id.
74. Exparte Halligan, No. 2008-1588, 2008 WL 4998541 at *1-2 (B.P.A.I.
[Vol. XX: I
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that the recitation of the programmed computer did not impose
"meaningful limits" on the claim's scope.75 Because the computer
tie merely added a general purpose computer programmed in an
unspecified way to execute the functional steps recited in the
claims, the Board found the claim did not satisfy the machine-
implementation inquiry under the Bilski test.76 Similarly, in Ex
parte Koo, the Board found that the claims directed to a method of
optimizing a query in a relational database system were not tied to
a machine or transformative.77 Reasoning that under the broadest
reasonable meaning the word "system" could mean a "software
system", the Board held the claims were not tied to a particular
machine. 78
There are several reasons why the Supreme Court should
abandon the particular machine-implementation requirement. A
first basic reason is that the Patent Act lists "machine" as a
separate and distinct category from process." Second, the
Supreme Court has never excluded from patent-eligible subject
matter processes that lack machine implementation." Rather, it
expressly stressed in Benson: "It is argued that a process patent
must be tied to a particular machine or apparatus or must operate
to change articles or materials to a 'different state or thing.' We
do not hold that no process patent could ever qualify if it did not
meet the requirements of our prior precedents."8' Third, the
Supreme Court should abandon the particular machine-
implementation requirement because it is ambiguous. Engineering
Nov. 24, 2008).
75. Id. at * 13. The Board also rejected the claimed over the second prong of
machine-or-transformation test holding that that the data was not transformative
because it did not represent physical and tangible objects. Id.
76. Scarsi, supra note 17
77. Id. (citing Ex parte Koo, No. 2008-1344, 2008 WL 5054161 (B.P.A.I.
Nov. 26, 2008)).
78. Id. The Board also rejected the claims over the first prong of the
machine-or-transformation test, holding that the steps of "evaluating",
"determining" and "reforming" did not constitute transformation of data or
signals.
79. Harkins, supra note 42 at 725; 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2006). See my following
discussion on software patents.
80. Id. at 725.
81. Benson, 409 U.S. at 71.
2009]
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designs embodied in computer programs can be implemented in
hardware, or in software, in such a way that the user would not be
able to distinguish between the two. 2 Although there may be
reasons, such as high costs, that encourage developers to embody
computer programs in one form or the other, it is clear that
software and hardware are equivalent in the sense described
above.83  Therefore, software, if incorporated into read-only
memory (ROM) and claimed as hardware, should arguably be
patentable under Bilski's test as a special purpose computer.
In fact, computer programs can be arguably viewed as machines
that have been constructed in the medium of text, such as source
and object code. 4 The similarities between computer programs
and physical machines support this argument: both computer
programs and machines produce useful behaviors and bring about
certain results.85 Like physical machines, programs usually work
together with other programs (and with other machines) to achieve
their results.86 For instance, application programs call upon
operating system programs, which call upon microcode programs
to execute the program functions.87 Additionally, programs, like
physical machines, are built from functional elements: physical
machines are built from physical structures (i.e. gears, wires, and
screws) whereas programs are built from information structures
(i.e. algorithms and data structures).88
82. Pamela Samuelson, et al., A Manifesto Concerning The Legal Protection
Of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 2308, 2316 (1994).
83. Id. at 2320. The same idea was expressed by Martin Campbell-Kelly and
Patrick Valduriez, in their research. They explained that software cannot be
made fully independent of hardware. According to their example, "to bootstrap
an operating system, a processor needs to execute special instructions that are
built in to the hardware. Firmware (or microcode) which consists of computer
code stored in programmable read-only memory (ROM) designates such special
purpose software." Accordingly, firmware patents can mix hardware and
software inventions thereby blurring the distinction between them. Martin
Campbell-Kelly & Patrick Valduriez, A Technical Critique of Fifty Software
Patents at 4 n.1l (Jul. 18, 2005) (unpublished manuscript, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-65092 1).
84. Samuelson, supra note 81, at 2316.
85. Id. at 2320.
86. Id. at 2320- 2321.
87. Id. at 2321.
88. Id.
[Vol. XX: I
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Thus, it appears that the machine prong of the "machine-or-
transformation" test is not an efficient tool to exclude bad software
patents. Rather than resolving the uncertainty that surrounds the
construction of section 101, this ambiguous inquiry merely
propagates unanswerable questions.89 The question whether
software is more like patentable machinery or an unpatentable
abstraction is yet to be resolved.90 Therefore, the Supreme Court
should reject the Federal Circuit's lofty machine inquiry and
invoke its own settled principles, namely that "anything under the
sun that is made by man"'" is patentable except for "laws of
nature, natural phenomena or abstract ideas"92  In Part V, this
article will suggest that the implementation of these principles
could be facilitated by the establishment of an advisory committee
of software experts that will assist the Patent Office and the courts
in identifying un-patentable abstract processes that should be
excluded under section 101.
B. The Transformation Prong of the "Machine-or-
Transformation " Test
As to the second prong of the "machine-or-transformation" test,
Bilski found that the transformation must be "central to the
purpose of the claimed process."93 The court reasoned:
89. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
90. Steven J. Frank, The Death of Business-Method Patents, IEEE
SPECTRUM, Mar. 2009, available at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/mar09/7909.
91. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309. Recently, the U.S. Solicitor General
argued, in a May 4 Brief submitted in opposition to the petition for a writ of
certiorari in the Bilski case, that the Supreme Court in Chakrabarty did not
provide the full quote. According to the full original quote in the legislative
record, "[a] person may have 'invented' a machine or a manufacture, which may
include anything under the sun that is made by man, but it is not necessarily
patentable under section 101 unless the conditions of the title are fulfilled." See
Posting of Brian Fletcher to PATENTABILITY, http://www.patentabilityblog.
com/tag/business-method/ (May 7, 2009). Nonetheless, it is patently clear that
after Chakrabarty, whenever courts had cited to the quote "anything under the
sun that is made by man," they intended to invoke Chakrabarty's broad
interpretation of section 101.
92. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
93. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962.
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So long as the claimed process is limited to a
practical application of a fundamental principle to
transform specific data, and the claim is limited to a
visual depiction that represents specific physical
objects or substances, there is no danger that the
scope of the claim would wholly preempt all uses of
the principle.94
The majority, however, failed to explain what kind of
transformation may qualify95 or when a "representative" of a
physical object is sufficiently linked to that object to satisfy the
transformation test.96 Moreover, the requirement that the
transformation must be central to the purpose of the claimed
process seems inconsistent with the principle that inventions must
be considered as a whole in asserting their patent eligibility under
section 101. 97
The uncertainty which surrounds the issue of "transformation"
was well presented by Judge Bryson during Bilski's en banc
hearing.9" Judge Bryson asked whether a curveball is patentable,
and then answered: "[a] curveball is a baseball which has been,
you could say, transformed into a baseball that has a great deal of
spin on it and is being thrown at a pace which it didn't have at the
time it was in the pitcher's hand."99 There are a handful of similar
absurd process patents that allegedly encompass transformation:
"A method and apparatus for exercising a curious animal such as a
housecat comprises a laser pointer mounted on a shaft driven by a
geared motor mounted on a pedestal."' '  Arguably, the cat is
being "transformed" from a bored cat to an amused one. Since
94. Id. at 963.
95. Id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting).
96. Id. at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
97. Id. at 994 (Newman, J., dissenting). As explained by Justice Newman: "It
is difficult to predict an adjudicator's view of the 'invention as a whole,' now
that patent examiners and judges are instructed to weigh the different process
components for their 'centrality' and the 'significance' of their 'extra-solution
activity' in a Section 101 inquiry."
98. Harkins, supra note 42, at 724-725.
99. Audio Recording: Oral Argument from In re Bilski, No. 2007-1130, May
8, 2008.
100. U.S. Patent No. 6,701,872 (filed Oct. 30, 2002).
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such transformation represents something tangible (a cat), this
absurd patent would have also satisfied Bilski's transformation
requirement. Another example is a method of swinging on a
swing "in which a user positioned on a standard swing suspended
by two chains from a substantially horizontal tree branch induces
side to side motion by pulling alternately on one chain and then the
other.' '.. Arguably, the swing is being transformed from its initial
position into a different one. Since such transformation represents
something tangible (the swing), this process could have been
patentable under Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test.
Even the Bilski claim itself arguably involves physical
transformation.'2 By using Bilski's claimed process, providers and
consumers enter into a series of transactions allowing them to buy
and sell a particular commodity at a particular price.' 3 This
reflects a physical process in which telephone calls are made,
meetings are held, and contracts are executed."4 Arguably, market
participants are transformed from a state of not being in a
commodity transaction to a state of being in such a transaction.' 5
Furthermore, under Bilski, transformation of data will be patent-
eligible when the data represents a "physical object or
substance."'0 6  For instance, according to the Bilski court, the
process recited in Abele, was held to be patent-eligible, because
that data represented physical and tangible objects, namely the
structure of bones, organs, and other body tissues.' 7  However,
transformation of data that represents intangibles will not be
patent-eligible according to the Federal Circuit."'
This dichotomy has been strongly criticized.' 9 Even if the
transformation requirement was relevant during the industrial age,
101. U.S. Patent No. 6,368,227 (filed Nov. 17, 2000).
102. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1009 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 962-963.
107. Id. (citing Abele, 684 F.2d at 908-09).
108. Id.
109. See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, An Initial Comment on In re Bilski:
Tangibility Gone Meta, PATENTLY 0, Nov. 1, 2008, http://www.patentlyo.com/
patent/2008/1 1/professor-colli.html.
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it appears inappropriate in the current information age." ' In his
comment "An Initial Comment on In re Bilski: Tangibility Gone
Meta," Professor Collins raised two important questions; first he
asks, "why should we treat information about tangible things in a
manner that is categorically different from the manner in which we
treat information about intangible things?""' Collins then asks
how can we determine whether data represents something
tangible?" 2  In a material universe, every process causes some
kind of physical transformation, even "if only at the microscopic
level or within the human body, including the brain.""' 3 Under a
broad perspective, data that represents one's longevity may
represent something physical - namely his body.' If so, then
the contention that the data in Bilski represented something
tangible, namely human actions, appears to be quite reasonable. 5
Accordingly, the transformation doctrine is not the proper
standard for eligible processes under section 101.116 Indeed, the
Patent Act itself lists "composition of matter" as a separate
category of subject matter from "process.""' 7 Moreover, the Patent
Act defines "process" in section 100(b)" 8 without any of the
limitations inherent in the "machine-or-transformation" test.' 9
Since the "transformation" prong is not tied to the other patent-
eligible categories under section 101, it should not be tied to the
"process" category. 20  Lastly and most importantly, the
transformation inquiry fails to satisfy its very own objectives. As
demonstrated, capricious interpretations may successfully construe
absurd inventions to satisfy Bilski's transformation requirement,
110. Harkins, supra note 42, at 725.
111. Collins, supra note 109.
112. Id.
113. Thomas F. Cotter, A Burkean Perspective on Patent Eligibility, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 855, 875 (2007).
114. Collins, supra note 109.
115. Id.
116. Harkins, supra note 42, at 725.
117. Id. See also 35 U.S.C. § 101.
118. The statutory definition reads: "The term 'process' means process, art,
or method, and includes a new use of a known process, machine, manufacture,
composition of matter, or material."
119. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1012 (Rader, J., dissenting).
120. Harkins, supra note 42, at 725.
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deeming this inquiry both redundant and useless. Therefore, in
Part V, infra, I will suggest abandoning this inquiry and instead,
applying the Supreme Court's well-settled principles that exclude
laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas, with the aid
of an advisory committee of software experts.
IV. WHAT ARE "BAD" SOFTWARE PATENTS?
A patent provides its owner with a monopoly.' 2' "It is an
exception to the general rule against monopolies and to the right to
access to a free and open market."' The power of Congress to
grant such exclusive rights stems from the U.S. Constitution.2 3
Congress may grant exclusive rights "to promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and
Discoveries."'2 4 This limited power reflects the policy goal of the
patent system: to provide an incentive to innovation on the one
hand and to enable public access to innovation on the other
hand. 25
Patent validity affects the public as a whole. 26  "Too much
patent protection can impede rather than promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts."'27 This is why abstract ideas are
excluded from patent protection, and this is why the Supreme
Court supports "invalidation of specious patents."'28 Such patents
restrain free trade and raise the costs of using the underlying
information. ' 29 Additionally, the cost of invalidating these patents
through litigation is enormous. 30 It is clear why striking down
121. Id. at 707.
122. Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806,
816 (1945).
123. Bryan Treglia, Patentable Subject Matter: Separating Abstract Ideas
and Laws of Nature from Patentable Inventions, 48 Jurimetrics J. 427, 430
(2008).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
125. Treglia, supra note 123, at 429.
126. Id.
127. Lab. Corp. of Am. v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 (2006).
128. Harkins, supra note 42, at 707.
129. Id.
130. Id. These high litigations costs are the result of two presumptions: (1)
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"bad patents" is as important as upholding "good patents."'31
But what do we mean when we categorize patents as "bad"? The
following section will discuss the history of software patents and
then analyze the three main characteristics of bad software patents:
triviality, stifling of subsequent innovation, and overbreadth.
A. The History of Software Patents
When software-related inventions began to appear, they were
deemed to be un-patentable subject matter by the Patent Office,
courts, and commentators. 3 ' In particular, "business methods,"
often involving software,'33 were excluded based on the notion that
free competition was sufficient to encourage new ways to do
business and therefore, there was no need to add further incentives
through the patent system.'3 4
The first Supreme Court case to consider the patentability of
software was Benson in 1972.' Benson concerned the
patentability of a computer program that converted binary coded
decimal numbers into a pure binary numbers, and the Court ruled
that the program was not patentable subject matter.'36 The Court
explained that granting a patent "would wholly preempt the
mathematical formula and in practical effect would be a patent on
the algorithm itself."' 37  It also expressed its concern that the
claims "were not limited to any particular art or technology, to any
particular apparatus or machinery, or to any particular end use."'138
Following Benson, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of
software patents in Flook. 3' The issue in Flook a claim that used a
the presumption of validity, and (2) the presumption of administrative
correctness (basically, that patent examiners do their work correctly).
131. Id.
132. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1092.
133. He, supra note 11, at 253.
134. Frank, supra note 90.
135. Eugene Derenyi, Software Copyright and Software Patent, STIKEMAN
ELLIOT, Sep. 27, 2007, http://www.stikeman.com/en/pdf/SoftwareCopyright
_PatentDerenyi_07.pdf.
136. Id.
137. Benson, 409 U.S. at 72.
138. Id. at 64.
139. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1094.
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particular mathematical formula to calculate an "alarm limit"- a
value that would indicate abnormal conditions during an
unspecified chemical reaction. 4 ' Arguing that the claim failed to
include any limitations specifying "how to select the appropriate
margin of safety, the weighting factor, or any of the other variables
the chemical processes at work, the [mechanism for]
monitoring of process variables, or the means of setting off an
alarm or adjusting an alarm system,"'' the Court rejected the
claims. Although Flook's invention was more than the algorithm
itself, the Court held that post-solution steps were insufficient to
distinguish this case from Benson.'4 2
The last Supreme Court case to address the issue of subject-
matter eligibility of software-related inventions was Diehr.'43
Diehr concerned a process claim for curing synthetic rubber
products.'" Notwithstanding the presence of a mathematical
formula in the claimed process, the Court held that "an application
of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known structure or
process may well be deserving of patent protection."' 45 Thus, the
Court found this software-related invention to be patent-eligible
subject matter. 146
Since 1982, there have been no Supreme Court cases on issues
of software patentability. ' Thus, "the Federal Circuit has been
left alone to harmonize information age innovations with industrial
age jurisprudence."'11 8  In In re Alappat,"4 the Federal Circuit
considered the patentability of a rasterizer 5 ° that mathematically
140. Flook, 437 U.S. at 586.
141. Id. at 586, 595.
142. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1095.
143. Id.
144. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 178-179.
145. Id. at 187.
146. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1096.
147. Robert E. Thomas, Debugging Software Patents: Increasing Innovation
and Reducing Uncertainty in Judicial Reform of Software Patent Law, 25
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 191, 202-3 (2008).
148. Korniczky, supra note 4, at 12.
149. In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en banc).
150. The Alappat Court explained the claim invention as follows: "Alappat's
invention relates generally to a means for creating a smooth waveform display
in a digital oscilloscope. The screen of an oscillosope is the front of a cathode-
ray tube (CRT), which is like a TV picture tube, whose screen, when in
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transforms data to eliminate aliasing in a digital oscilloscope. 5'
The court stressed that software-related inventions will be deemed
non-statutory only to the extent that the claim as a whole
"represents nothing more than abstract ideas."' 52 Accordingly, the
court upheld the claimed invention and reasoned that "[t]his is not
a disembodied mathematical concept which may be characterized
as an 'abstract idea,' but rather a specific machine to produce a
useful, concrete, and tangible result."' 53
It has been argued that Alappat, with its "useful, concrete, and
tangible" test, substantially lowered the software patentability
hurdle.'54 It has also been noted that "without the approach of
Alappat, software patents would be virtually nonexistent because
the software is simply an algorithm for manipulating electronic
operation, presents an array (or raster) of pixels arranged at intersections of
vertical columns and horizontal rows, a pixel being a spot on the screen which
may be illuminated by directing an electron beam to that spot, as in TV. Each
column in the array represents a different time period, and each row represents a
different magnitude. An input signal to the oscilloscope is sampled and digitized
to provide a waveform data sequence (vector list), wherein each successive
element of the sequence represents the magnitude of the waveform at a
successively later time. The waveform data sequence is then processed to
provide a bit map, which is a stored data array indicating which pixels are to be
illuminated. The waveform ultimately displayed is formed by a group of
vectors, wherein each vector has a straight line trajectory between two points on
the screen at elevations representing the magnitudes of two successive input
signal samples and at horizontal positions representing the timing of the two
samples. Because a CRT screen contains a finite number of pixels, rapidly
rising and falling portions of a waveform can appear discontinuous or jagged
due to differences in the elevation of horizontally contiguous pixels included in
the waveform. In addition, the presence of "noise" in an input signal can cause
portions of the waveform to oscillate between contiguous pixel rows when the
magnitude of the input signal lies between values represented by the elevations
of the two rows. Moreover, the vertical resolution of the display may be limited
by the number of rows of pixels on the screen. The noticeability and appearance
of these effects is known as aliasing. To overcome these effects, Alappat's
invention employs an anti-aliasing system wherein each vector making up the
waveform is represented by modulating the illumination intensity of pixels
having center points bounding the trajectory of the vector." Id. at 1537.
151. Id. at 1544.
152. Id. at 1543.
153. Id. at 1544.
154. Thomas, supra note 147, at 206.
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signals inside a digital device, such as a computer."' 55 Indeed, the
court in Alappat concluded its decision with the following dicta
directed to the machine-implementation test:
Under the Board majority's reasoning, a
programmed general purpose computer could never
be viewed as patentable subject matter under § 101.
This reasoning is without basis in the law. The
Supreme Court has never held that a programmed
computer may never be entitled to patent
protection. Indeed, the Benson court specifically
stated that its decision therein did not preclude "a
patent for any program servicing a computer."
Consequently, a computer operating pursuant to
software may represent patentable subject matter,
provided, of course, that the claimed subject matter
meets all of the other requirements of Title 35. In
any case, a computer, like a rasterizer, is apparatus
not mathematics. 156
In so concluding, the court acknowledged that certain software
inventions may be patentable under section 101.
In the 1998 case State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc., the Federal Circuit officially expanded the
scope of patentable subject matter to include business methods.'57
The invention at issue in State Street related to a computerized
accounting system that managed mutual fund investment
structures. 5 8 The issue in the case was whether computer software
performing the mathematical accounting steps was patentable
subject matter. 59 The Federal Circuit held that "the transformation
of data, representing discrete dollar amounts, by a machine
through a series of mathematical calculations into a final share
price, constitutes a practical application of a mathematical
algorithm, formula, or calculation, because it produces a useful,
155. Treglia, supra note 123, at 439.
156. Alappat, 33 F.3d at 1545 (internal citation omitted).
157. He, supra note 11, at 253.
158. State Street, 149 F.3d at 1370.
159. Id.
2009]
21
Filmar: A Critique of In Re Bilski
Published by Via Sapientiae, 2016
DEPAUL J ART, TECH & IP LAW
concrete and tangible result - a final share price."' 6 ° This new
test was followed by AT&T Corp. v. Excel Communications,
Inc.,"'61 which commentators describe as standing for the premise
that as long as data transformation is present and the invention
produces a useful, concrete and tangible result, no rejections under
section 10 1 should be made. 162
These two decisions greatly broadened the limits of section 101
and opened the floodgates.163  Afterwards, the PTO "was
inundated with claims that do not involve technology, including
financial methods, arbitration methods, teaching methods, and
even methods for simple routines such as swinging on a
playground swing."'" Indeed, in holding that software that
"merely manipulates numbers, juggling them and exchanging them
and transforming them into other numbers, is producing something
tangible," the court nearly eliminated the limitations under section
101.165 As a result, the courts and the PTO found it necessary to
reconsider the limits of subject matter patentable processes.166
The Board of Patent and Interferences began to narrow State
Street's reach in Ex parte Lundgren. '67 Lundgren reflected the
PTO's stand against the subject-matter eligibility of software-
related inventions.'68 Although the majority upheld a method of
compensating managers in a privately owned firm under the
"useful, concrete and tangible" result test and rejected the
"technological arts" test,'69 Judge Barrett's dissent was ultimately
160. Id. at 1373.
161. AT&T Corp. v. Excel Commc'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(holding a telecommunications system with multiple long-distance service
providers patentable under Section 101).
162. See Osenga, supra note 9, at 1102.
163. He, supra note 11, at 256.
164. Id.
165. Gleick, supra note 2, at 48.
166. He, supra note 11, at 256.
167. Exparte Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d 1385 (2005).
168. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1103.
169. Under the "technological art" test, claims that were outside the
technological arts, i.e., "an economic theory expressed as a mathematical
algorithm without the disclosure or suggestion of a computer, automated means,
apparatus of any kind" were excluded as ineligible subject matter. He, supra
note 11, at 257.
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more influential. 17 Judge Barrett, joined by Judge Smith,
concluded that the claimed process "does not fall within the
definition of a process under § 101 because it does not transform
physical subject matter into a different state or thing."'' The
influence of this contention is reflected in the PTO 2005 Interim
Examination Guidelines, 17 2 which were issued because the PTO
had "seen increasing numbers of applications... that raise subject
matter eligibility issues." '173 More importantly, these guidelines
determined that in deciding whether a claim invention recites a
practical application of a judicial exception (i.e., abstract idea, or
laws of nature), the examiner must decide whether the claimed
invention "transforms" an article or physical object into a different
state or thing or whether the claimed inventions produces a
"useful, concrete and tangible result."'74
Following these developments, the Federal Circuit released two
decisions prior to In re Bilski all narrowing the scope of patentable
subject matter.'75 The claimed invention in In re Comiskey'76 was
related to a "method and system for mandatory arbitration
involving legal documents."'77  The Federal Circuit rejected
Comiskey's claims, because they "were not tied to any machine,
recited nothing more than an abstract idea, and impermissibly
sought to patent the use of human intelligence in and of itself."' 78
In so holding, the Federal Circuit made its first step away from the
broad "useful, concrete and tangible result" test. '79
The second step was made in In re Nuijten, "' which was
released on the same day the Federal Circuit released In re
170. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1104.
171. Lundgren, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1431-1432.
172. U.S. PTO, Interim Guidelines for Examination of Patent Applications
for Patent Subject Matter Eligibility, (Nov. 22, 2005) available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/guidelines 10120
051026.pdf
173. Id. at 1.
174. Osenga, supra note 9, at 1106.
175. Korniczky, supra note 4, at 12.
176. In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
177. Id. at 1368.
178. Komiczky, supra note 4, at 12.
179. Id.
180. In re Nuitjen, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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Comiskey. The claimant in Nuijten disclosed a method for
reducing distortion caused by the introduction of digital
watermarks into a signal and included claims for the signal
itself. 8 The court rejected the claim for the signal itself because it
did not fall within any of the four statutory categories under
section 101.82 Thus, the majority held that the enumerated
categories of inventions - process, machine, manufacture, and
composition of matter - set appropriate bounds for patentable
subject matter under section 101. 83
B. What Constitutes a "Bad" Software-Related Invention?
The question of software patentability has been considered since
software-related inventions first appeared in the 1980s.184 It was
commonly said that patents would severely damage the software
industry.185 Because software inventions may be much easier to
design and much cheaper to manufacture compared to hardware,"'
it is often argued that patents are not required to promote this type
of innovation.'87
181. Id. at 1348-9.
182. Id. at 1357.
183. Scott Bloebaum, From Telegraphs to Content Protection: The Evolution
of Signals as Patentable Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 9 N.C. J.L. &
Tech. 243, 265-6 (2008).
184. Frank, supra note 90. In a 1994 manifesto entitled "Software Patents:
An Industry at Risk," the League for Programming Freedom discussed "the
special properties of software that make the application of the patent system
inappropriate", including "the complexity of software" and unprecedented rapid
change and development. See Gordon Irlam & Ross Williams, Software Patents:
An Industry at Risk (Jan. 25, 1994), http://progfree.org/Patents/industry-at-
risk.html.
185. Robert P. Merges, Software and Patent Scope: A Report from the
Middle Innings, 85 TEX. L. REv. 1627 (2007).
186. Bilski, for example, likely spent only negligible sums to develop his
invention. A program of 100,000 components could be written by two good
programmers in a year. The equipment needed for developing software costs
less than $10,000 and the total investment would be less than $100,000. By
contrast, an automobile usually contains less than 100,000 components, but it
requires a large team of developers and costs tens of millions of dollars to
design. See Richard Stallman & Simson Garfinkle, Viewpoint: Against Software
Patents, 35 CoMM. ACM 17 (1992).
187. Thomas, supra note 147, at 193.
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Nonetheless, "with the persistence of rabbits in a field or
termites in a fallen tree, software patents just kept showing up."'' 88
However judged, whether by overall industry revenues, by product
innovation, or by frequency of new firm entry, the industry today
seems quite sound.'89 It appears that the more pressing questions
now concern the criteria for issuance and the scope of protection
to be afforded to software inventions, rather than questions of
patentability per se. "' Therefore, the patent system should focus
on considering the contours and details of the software protection
doctrine. 191
Yet, because in some cases the operations of a computer
program might be "too mathematical" or too close to basic laws of
nature, it is hard to draw the line between unpatentable math and
its patentable application.'9 2 A problem is that while all software
ultimately reduces to mathematical operations, only some software
controls physical things such as Diehr's curing rubber system.'93
Indeed, while some software-related inventions arguably perform
physical transformation of things that are tangible and predictable,
some merely perform abstract calculations such as bookeeping.'94
The question, however, is how to distinguish between the two.
This sub-section will argue that "bad" software inventions are
trivial and absurd inventions that merely perform simple
calculations or serve as building blocks for the development of
other programs and computer applications.'95  The following
section will suggest that an advisory committee of software experts
should be adopted to aid the Patent Office and the courts in
identifying such bad software inventions.
1. Excluding Software Patents That Are Too Trivial
Much of the hostility against software patents is founded on
188. Merges, supra note 185, at 1628.
189. Id.
190. Julie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope and Innovation in the
Software Industry, 89 CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2001).
191. Merges, supra note 185 at 1628-29.
192. Frank, supra note 90.
193. Id.
194. Thomas, supra note 147, at 196-97.
195. Id.
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examples of issued software patents that are perceived to be
trivial.'96 Perhaps the most cited example is the Amazon.com
"one-click" patent. 1' The "one-click" patent was based on Jeff
Bezos' idea of offering a shortcut to online purchasers. Instead of
using the regular virtual "shopping cart" that presents the list of
chosen items when clicked on, Bezos' "invention" enables users to
choose an item with only one click and use a shipping address and
credit-card number already on file.'98 This patent was highly
criticized for its triviality,'99 because it added nothing novel that is
not merely "obvious" 0 0 to earlier shopping-cart systems.2"'
Another example is Bruce Dickens' patent titled "Date Formatting
and Sorting for Dates Spanning the Turn of the Century." '
Dickens' patent discloses:
A method for repairing databases full of now-
suspect two-digit years: Pick an arbitrary cutoff
(say, '50); if a year has a higher number, assume it
belongs to the old century; if a year has a lower
number, assume it belongs to the new century.
Thus: '08, '11, '58, '97, become 2008, 2011, 1958,
1997.203
This invention appears trivial.0 Most probably, if one hundred
computer programmers skilled in their art were asked to write a
code "for repairing full of now-suspect two-digit years," at least
eighty of them would have come out with a substantially similar
196. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note, 83, at 7.
197. Id.
198. Gleick, supra note 2, at 44.
199. Martin Campbell-Kelly, Not All Bad. An Historical Perspective on
Software Patents, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. TECH. L. REv. 191, 231 (2005).
200. I use the term "obvious" here in its plain and common meaning, "Easily
perceived or understood; quite apparent," and not its technical meaning under
35 USC § 103. Thefreedictionary.com, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/
obvious (last visited May 17, 2009).
201. Gleick, supra note 2, at 48.
202. U.S. Patent No. 5,806,063 (filed Sep. 8, 1998).
203. James Gleick, Who Wants to Be a Billionaire?, AROUND,
http://www.around.com/dickens.html.
204. Id.
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code. However, without a threshold level of technical merit to
"knock it out," and in the absence of sufficient grounds to reject it
pursuant to the novelty requirement in sections 102, the examiner
had no choice other than to uphold the claimed method.
Some argue that software patents are inappropriate because
software is a cumulative technology. 2°5  A software product
typically depends on hundreds of previous innovations. 26  By
nature, software inventions are incremental and are rarely written
from scratch.0 7 Generally, without their interactions with other
technologies, software patents have little intrinsic value.28 As a
result, it is hard to evaluate the degree of innovation and the non-
obviousness of a software invention with respect to the prior art
pursuant to section 103 of the Patent Act.20 9 Some argue that due
to the cumulative nature of software patents, the standard of
obviousness developed in other fields is inappropriate for
software.2 1°
Moreover, software inventions are sometimes not sufficiently
innovative.2 1 1 "When a software engineer at IBM comes up with a
new idea, it's usually safe to bet that dozens or hundreds of
software engineers in cubbyholes around the world are thinking
along the same lines,"212 and would write substantially the same
code. Any idea generated so easily and regularly is arguably
trivial .2 3 Thus, if patents should be the exception and not the rule,
then software inventions should not qualify for a government-
sanctioned monopoly. 214
Furthermore, because hundreds of thousands of software patents
exist, it is almost impossible to keep track of their inventive
205. Campbell-Kelly, supra note 199, at 192.
206. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 41.
207. Id.
208. See Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics
of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 839, 881 (1990).
209. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 7.
210. Stallman & Garfinkle, supra note 186, at 19.
211. Richard R. Nelson, Intellectual Property Protection for Cumulative
Systems Technology, 94
COLUMBIA L. REV. 2674, 2674 (1994).
212. Gleick, supra note 2, at 51.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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step.215 The fact that software patents emerged out of a new field
of technology also affects one's ability to resolve questions of
obviousness pursuant to section 103.216 The problem is that when
a new field suddenly opens, there may be many things that need to
be done which are "patently obvious." '217 Because the burden of
proof rests on the examiner according to 35 U.S.C. § 131, the
examiner cannot say "gee, that's obvious to me." '218 Rather, the
examiner must base his rejections on the pertinent prior art. 19
However, many software improvements are not researchable in the
literature.22 °  They may be documented via developer
specifications or online FAQs while the source code itself is never
released. 2 ' Thus, conducting prior art searches for software
patents is enormously complicated.2 Given the complexity that
surrounds the obviousness examination regarding software-related
inventions, the necessity of a flexible examination procedure under
section 101 that will function as a gatekeeper of trivial software
patents appears compelling.
2. Excluding Software Patents that Do Not Reflect Real
Inventions
Some software patents are merely a strategic tactic carried out
by big firms to lock out competitors.223 The idea is that strong
ownership over software would tend to "lock in" a dominant
product.224 When software patents cover abstract ideas or laws of
nature, they provide individuals with control over something they
215. Richard Stallman, Software patents - Obstacles to software
development, Transcript of a talk presented 2002-03-25 at the University of
Cambridge Computer Laboratory, organized by the Foundation for Information
Policy Research, available at http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/-mgk25/stallman-
patents.html.
216. Gleick, supra note 2, at 50.
217. Id.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 42.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 17.
224. Merges, supra note 185, at 1634.
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did not create and enable them to prevent others from achieving
results based on these principles. 25 By granting software patents,
the patent system impedes the attempts of others to innovate.2 6
Hence, the increase in competitors' research and development
(R&D) costs results in an overall decline in innovation.227 Some
argue that "anyone who puts a small gloss on this fundamental
technology, calls it proprietary, and then tries to keep others from
building further on it, is a thief"' 28
Accordingly, the patent system should be wary of giving
software inventors too much protection that impedes the ability of
others to innovate. 29 Section 101, as a threshold matter, should
thus enable the patent system to effectively exclude inventions that
fail to solve real world problems.
3. Excluding Broad Software Inventions
Although some evidence suggests that the availability of
software patents generally promotes innovation, the patent system
will inevitably constrain innovation if it affords too much
protection. 3 "Sometimes too much patent protection can impede
rather than 'promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,' the
constitutional objective of patent and copyright protection. 231
"A 'broad' patent is one which covers a wide area of the
inventive space. '"232 The basic objection to broad patents, one
which covers a wide area of the inventive space, is based on the
assertion that they stifle innovation.233  They discourage
competitors from developing closely related inventions and
225. Thomas, supra note 147, at 195.
226. Id. at 210.
227. Id. at 193.
228. James Gleick, The Patent That Never Was, AROUND,
http://www.around.com/halloffame.html.
229. Thomas, supra note 147, at 214.
230. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 5.
231. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs, Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126
(2006) (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens and Souter, JJ., dissenting from dismissal
of writ of certiorari).
232. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 20.
233. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 16.
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prevent them from entering the market. 34  "Pure software
inventions"-software inventions that are characterized by their
cumulative nature - are most commonly associated with the risk
of providing too much protection. 35 Most inventions, including
software inventions, are not pioneering advances over the prior
creation. Therefore, they should not be entitled to broad
protection.236
Professor Martin Campbell-Kelly from Warwick University's
Department of Computer Science and Patrick Valduriez, a research
director at National Center for Computer Science in France
(INRIA), provide a good example of a pure software invention that
was defined sufficiently narrowly to allow competitors to design
around the invention: the MP3 music compression algorithm. 37
Although a patent was eventually granted,2 38 a number of industry
substitutes are currently being developed, such as Microsoft's
WMA, Real Networks RAM, Apple Computer QIF, and the open
source OGG format. On the other hand, some software-related
inventions, called "discrete inventions," are pioneering inventions
entitled to broad protection.239 Campbell-Kelly and Valduriez use
the example of Texas Instruments' "Speak & Spell" children's
educational toy: although the inventor was granted broad
protection, there was no hindrance to incremental
improvements. 4 In fact, the availability of a temporary monopoly
encouraged the invention of the toy in the first place.24 '
Typically, however, given the lack of technical merit, software
inventions are likely to be afforded more protection than they
234. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 21.
235. See discussion on the cumulative nature of patents supra.
236. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 41.
237. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 22.
238. U.S. Patent No. 5,701,346 (filed Dec. 23, 1997).
239. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 21. A similar distinction
was made by Karjala who distinguished between pure software patents, which
claim improvements in programming or inventions embodied wholly in a
program, and computer related patents, where the claim is for a machine or
process that encompasses a computer program. See Dennis S. Karjala, The
Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright in the Protection of Computer
Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 60-63 (1998).
240. Campbell-Kelly & Valduriez, supra note 83, at 21.
241. Id.
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deserve.242 Therefore, if courts fail to adequately consider the
unique traits of software inventions,243 software patents will
consequently grant their owners the monopoly to control
innovation in related areas. 2"
V. THE CREATION OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OF SOFTWARE
EXPERTS
Ultimately, there should not be a bright-line rule on how the
Patent Office and the courts should determine whether a software
invention is a patentable process under section 10 1 in order to both
protect inventors' investments and safeguard the market from bad
patents.245 In the end, there should not be a bright line rule how
the PTO and the courts must determine the patentability of process
under section 101.246 Rather, the Supreme Court must leave room
for future technological advances to pass the threshold of section
101.247 As discussed, Bilski's attempt to apply industrial age
limitations to information age innovations is subject to failure.
Indeed, while "today's software transforms our lives without
physical anchors," '248 Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test
"not only risks hobbling these advances, but precluding patent
protection for tomorrow's technologies."249
Bilski's "machine-or-transformation" test should be abandoned,
because it is ambiguous and inconsistent with Supreme Court
precedent.2" The Supreme Court has never held the "machine-or-
transformation" test to be the sole test for patentable processes
under section 101.251 In fact, in both Benson and Flook, the
Supreme Court was careful to avoid a rule that "would freeze §
242. Id.
243. Cohen & Lemley, supra note 190, at 39.
244. Id.
245. Beth Simone Noveck, "Peer to Patent" Collective Intelligence, Open
Review, And Patent Reform, 20 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 123, 127 (2006).
246. Harkins, supra note 42, at 729.
247. Id.
248. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting).
249. Id.
250. Arner, supra note 40.
251. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 977 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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101 to old technologies." '252 In Diehr, the Supreme Court's last
word on the patentability of process claims,253 the Court
emphasized that statutory subject matter should include "anything
under the sun that is made by man." '254 The Federal Circuit itself
doubted its "machine-or-transformation" test when it recognized
the possibility that the Supreme Court will "ultimately decide to
alter or perhaps even set aside this test to accommodate emerging
technologies. 255
Instead of Bilski's test, courts should return to the practical,
well-established standards which determine eligibility under
section 101: "anything under the sun that is made by man" '56
should be patentable, with the exception of "laws of nature, natural
phenomena, or abstract ideas." '57  The implementation of these
judicial limitations is not an easy task, particularly when dealing
with new technologies, such as software: "Patent Examiners are
often ill-prepared to evaluate software patent applications to
determine if they represent techniques that are widely known or
obvious- both of which are grounds for rejection." '258 The reality is
that more than half of the patent examiners in the field of software
have been employed by the Patent Office for less than two years,
and they are not required to possess an advanced degree.259
Nonetheless, they have wide discretion in deciding whether to
grant a twenty-year monopoly.26 ° Indeed, commentators criticize
"the frequency with which the Patent Office issues patents on
shockingly mundane business inventions,""26 which results in the
issuance of many business method patents that are "facially (even
farcically) obvious to persons outside the USPTO." '262
Consequently, private parties are forced to invalidate these patents
252. Harkins, supra note 42, at 729.
253. Id. at 182.
254. Deihr, 450 U.S. at 182
255. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 956.
256. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 309.
257. Diehr, 450 U.S. at 185.
258. Stallman & Garfinkle, supra note 185, at 17.
259. Noveck, supra note 245, at 132.
260. Id.
261. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for
Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263, 268 (2000).
262. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1007 (Mayer, J., dissenting).
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through excessive litigation."' The Patent Public Advisory
Committee itself admitted in its Annual Report from 2007 that
"the Office is receiving an ever-increasing number of highly
complex cases that require increased resources for adequate
examination."2"
Therefore, as this article will explain, an advisory committee of
experts in the field of software that will determine the patentability
of software-related inventions should be established. This
Committee would consist of legal advisors, familiar with Supreme
Court precedents regarding the patentability of process claims
under section 101, and computer scientists - both academics and
programmers - familiar with the current stage of their art. Their
task will be to provide ex-ante advice to patent examiners during
the examination process, as well as ex-post advice to judges during
the judicial review process as to the patentability and validity of
software inventions under section 101, based upon Supreme
Court's precedents.
A. An Advisory Committee of Software Experts - Ex-Ante
Advice
"Attracting and retaining the most qualified workforce possible
is ultimately the key to a successful examination system." '265
Indeed, "the most sophisticated search tools, and the clearest
applications and standards are unavailing if the USPTO does not
hire, train, and retain talented, dedicated employees." '266 Therefore,
an advisory committee of software experts can assist patent
examiners in identifying bad software inventions, which are either
too trivial, too broad, or carry a concrete risk of stifling subsequent
innovation.
Indeed, the idea of consulting outside experts for the
263. William Krause, Sweeping the E-Commerce Patent Minefield: The
Need for a Workable Business Method Exception, 24 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 79,
97 (2000).
264. U.S. PTO, Patent Public Advisory Committee Ann. Rep. 5 (2007),
available at http://www.uspto.gov/go/com/advisory/reports/ppac_2007
annualrpt.pdf. [hereinafter Report]
265. Id. at 6.
266. Id.
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examination level of patent applications is not new. Two centuries
ago, it was contemplated that patent examination is "more within
the information of a board of academical [sic] professors." '267 Even
the first patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, consulted with Joseph
Hutchinson, Professor of Chemistry at the University of
Pennsylvania, before issuing a patent on an alchemical process. 6
Professor Beth Simone Noveck of New York Law School
previously proposed to address the problem of deficient
information in the patent review process through the creation of an
open patent examination, named "Peer-to-Patent." '69  Professor
Noveck suggested opening the examination process by allowing
the scientific community to participate in determining whether an
invention is truly novel or obvious. 7 In June 2007, the Patent
Office implemented this open review model as a pilot called
"Community Patent Review."27' The pilot focused on "integrating
an open peer review process with the USPTO, creating and
amalgamating a vetted database of prior art references to inform
examination, and developing deliberation methodologies and
technologies that allow community ranking of the data forwarded
to the patent examiner. 27 2
However, the establishment of an advisory committee creates
potential confidentiality problems. The members of this committee
are both colleagues and potential competitors of the applicant;
27 1
hence, there exists the possibility that members of the expert
committee will be biased. Therefore, as an initial requirement, the
members of the expert committee should be nominated by the PTO
for a period of no more than one year during which they will be
precluded from obtaining other employment. In this way, their
loyalty to the patentee and the public as whole will be enhanced.
267. Noveck, supra note 245, at 124.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 127.
270. Id.
271. U.S. PTO, DRAFT STRATEGIC PLAN 2007-2012, 18 (2006), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/stratplan2007-2012v6.doc. See
also, http://www.uspto.gov/web/patents/peerpriorartpilot/.
272. Noveck, supra note 245, at 128.
273. Mario Biagioli, Bringing Peer Review to Patents, FIRST MONDAY, June
4, 2007, http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view
/1868/1751.
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Additionally, their familiarity with the recent state of their art will
be warranted.
In addition, there are two other possible alternatives to overcome
the fundamental problem of confidentiality. The first alternative is
to postpone the examination process by the committee until
eighteen months after the patent application is filed, because most
patent applications, regardless of whether they are later granted,
are published after eighteen months.274 While this alternative will
introduce some additional delay in the issuance of software
patents, it would eliminate the confidentiality problem. In fact,
according to the Official Gazette of the USPTO, dated April 21,
2009, the average filing date of software applications receiving a
first office action in the last three months is July 12, 2005.275
Thus, under the current examination procedure, it takes about three
and half years from the filing date of software patent applications
to the date of first office action. Hence, a period of eighteen
months will not necessarily constitute a delay if more software
examiners are hired. In any event, some delay, when carried out
for the sake of improving the quality of issued software patents, is
tolerable.
Alternatively, to overcome the confidentiality issue and avoid
any additional delays in the examination process of software
applications, committee members should be required to follow the
rules that govern all USPTO employees, particularly those
expressed by 35 U.S.C. § 122 and 18 U.S.C. § 2071. Pursuant to
35 USC § 122, all USPTO employees must preserve pending
applications for patents in confidence until they are either
published or patented.276 Additionally, under 18 USC § 2071,277
274. Noveck, supra note 245, at 129.
275. U.S. PTO, OFFICIAL GAZETTE 1341 (April 21, 2009), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/og/2009/week 16/TOC.htm#refl 9.
276. U.S. PTO, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 101 (5th ed., 16th rev, 1994).
277. 18 U.S.C. § 2071 reads as follows:
(a) Whoever willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes,
mutilates, obliterates, or destroys, or attempts to do so, or,
with intent to do so takes and carries away any record,
proceeding, map, book, paper, document, or other thing, filed
or deposited with any clerk or officer of any court of the
United States, or in any public office, or with any judicial or
35
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different sanctions, such as suspension, removal, and even criminal
penalties, are imposed on violations of the confidentiality
requirement during the examination process.278 Consequently,
rather than postponing the examination process of software
applications to eliminate conflicts of interest between the
committee members' personal financial interests and their
professional commitments to the patent system, this alternative
allows the examination process to begin immediately after an
application is filed.
Finally, to finance the establishment of this expert committee,
the 2007 Patent Public Advisory Committee Recommendations
should be implemented regarding the development of a "highly
complex application" fee structure.279 Accordingly, the Patent
Office should develop a new fee structure that anticipates the real
resource requirements necessary for properly examining software
inventions to ensure quality examination. 280
B. Appointing Software Experts- Ex-Post Advice
Appointing an expert to testify as a witness pursuant to Rule 706
of the Federal Rules of Evidence is sometimes suggested as a
means for the court to enhance its ability to deal with complex
issues of science and technology.28" ' A trial court may also appoint
a non-testifying technical consultant, or a "special master"
public officer of the United States, shall be fined under this
title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both.
(b) Whoever, having the custody of any such record,
proceeding, map, book, document, paper, or other thing,
willfully and unlawfully conceals, removes, mutilates,
obliterates, falsifies, or destroys the same, shall be fined under
this title or imprisoned not more than three years, or both; and
shall forfeit his office and be disqualified from holding any
office under the United States. As used in this subsection, the
term "office" does not include the office held by any person as
a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the United States.
278. Id.
279. Report, supra note 264, at 6.
280. Id.
281. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMMITTEE 97 (1990).
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pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 2 to
assist the judge in understanding highly complex issues.283 This
sub-section will argue that federal courts should exploit these
mechanisms and consult with software experts to determine
patent-eligibility of software inventions under section 101 of the
Patent Act. Indeed, as the "Manual on Scientific Evidence" 2"
reveals, some judges do utilize these authorities when confronted
with patent law cases. Indeed, more than half of the judges that
participated in Joe S. Cecil and Thomas E. Willging's survey
mentioned patent law cases are a type of cases that often
necessitates the appointment of experts.285 Nonetheless, this sub-
section recommends turning this practice into a routine procedure
exploited by courts in all cases concerning questions of eligibility
of software patents under section 101.
Pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, trial
courts have wide discretion to appoint experts when the experts are
likely to clarify issues under consideration.28 6 One case which
demonstrates the important function of court-appointed experts in
cases concerning computer programs is Computer Associates
International, Inc. v. Altai, Inc. .287 The issue in CA International
was how to determine "substantial similarity" between two
computer programs to prove copyright infringement. 288 Because
of the extensive technical evidence and expert testimony
anticipated from both sides, the court appointed its own expert
from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, pursuant to Rule
706.289 In this particularly interesting appointment, the appointed
expert went beyond analyzing and interpreting the facts of the case
and also suggested his own alternative legal analysis to bring the
copyright law protecting computer software into compliance with
282. FED. R. Civ. P. 53.
283. FED. R. EVID. 706.
284. Joe S. Cecil & Thomas E. Willging, Court-Appointed Experts, in
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 525, 539 (Washington, DC:
Federal Judicial Center, 1994).
285. Id. at 539-540.
286. Id. at 533.
287. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 775 F. Supp. 544 (E.D.N.Y.
1991).
288. Id. at 558.
289. Id. at 549.
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the practices in the field of computer science."' On appeal, when
one party argued that the district court had erred in relying on the
court-appointed expert's opinions, the Court of Appeals explained
that the complex technical nature of computer software justified
expanding the role of the expert in that case.29  A similar
justification should support the appointment of software experts
that will aid courts in developing guidelines to determine patent-
eligibility of software patents under section 101, as this issue is
highly complex.
Federal courts also have an inherent authority to appoint
technical advisors.292 The role of a technical advisor is to advise
the court, but not to provide evidence or decide the case.293 The
appointment of a technical advisor will be justified in cases that
raise problems of unusual difficulty, sophistication, and
complexity, or involve issues well beyond the regular questions of
fact and law which judges routinely face.294 In TechSearch L.L.C.
v. Intel Corp., for instance, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court's appointment of a technical advisor. TechSearch concerned
infringement litigation over a complex patent on "a method or
computer for 'emulating' target instructions of the instruction set
of a target computer using, inter alia, 'emulation registers' capable
of corresponding to registers in the target computer. ' 295  The
Federal Circuit considered the role of a technical advisor in
assisting the court in understanding the scientific and technical
evidence presented and explained that in patent cases, "such
evidence.., includes expert testimony, scientific articles and texts,
and patents, upon which the court must rely in understanding the
technology so that it can interpret the patent claims and determine
whether to grant motions for summary judgment of validity,
invalidity, infringement or noninfringement. ' '296  Because the
district court had to consider and understand complex technical
290. Cecil & Wilging, supra note 284, at 533.
291. Computer Assoc. Int'l, Inc. v. Altai, Inc., 982 F.2d 693, 713-14 (2d Cir.
1992).
292. TechSearch L.L.C. v. Intel Corp., 286 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
293. Cecil & Willging, supra note 284, at 534.
294. Id. at 534.
295. TechSearch, 286 F.3d at 1370.
296. Id. at 1377.
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concepts beyond normal technical and scientific facts, the Federal
Circuit concluded that the appointment was appropriate.97
Accordingly, because the questions of patent-eligibility of
software under section 101 are complex and sophisticated, this
authority may also provide a legal justification for considering ex
post advices from software experts. However, if these software
experts will eventually be required to testify, they will have to be
nominated pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence.298
Alternatively, courts may utilize their authority to appoint
special masters pursuant to Rule 53 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure.299 Indeed, special masters have been appointed for
their expertise in specific fields, such as accounting, finance,
science and technology.3"' With respect to patent cases, the
Federal Circuit has acknowledged that "where complicated issues
of patent law are involved, the appointment of an experienced
attorney is quite appropriate.""3 1 Indeed, Rule 53 authorizes such
appointments to aid judges in handling pretrial matters tried
without a jury3 2 "that cannot be addressed effectively and timely
by an available district court judge or magistrate judge of the
district. ' 303 The appointment of a special master involves largely
the same considerations discussed supra with respect to court-
appointed experts and technical advisors. Special masters must
produce a report on the matters investigated, including any
findings of fact or conclusions of law.3 °4 The parties may stipulate
that the special master's findings of fact will be accepted as final,
leaving only questions of law for review.3 5 Otherwise, the court
must decide de novo all objections to a special master's findings of
297. Id. at 1379.
298. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (Fourth) § 11.51 (2004)
[hereinafter MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION]
299. Fed. R. CIV. P. 53
300. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 298, § 11.52.
301. Constant v. Advanced Micro-Devices, Inc., 848 F.2d 1560,1567 (Fed.
Cir. 1988).
302. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 298, § 11.52.
303. FED. R. CIv.. P. 53(a)(1)(C).
304. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e).
305. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 298, § 11.52.
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fact. 306
Hence, with respect to patent cases concerning patent-eligibility
of software patents, courts should exploit their authority to appoint
a special master with expertise in software, who will aid them in
determining patent eligibility under section 101 of the Patent Act.
Indeed, section 16 of the Patent Reform Act of 2007 recognized
the advantages of using special masters in patent cases and
required the Director of the Administrative Office of the United
States Courts to conduct a study of the use of special masters in
patent litigation. °7 Thus, this Act also recommends expanding the
use of special masters to patent infringement cases.
To insure the fairness of the proceeding, the identification and
selection process of an expert, technical advisor or special master
who will aid federal courts must be neutral." 8 The appointed
expert should be able to perform an analysis under section 101
based on the general knowledge accepted in the field of software,
regardless of his or her personal interests. Courts should make
every effort to appoint an expert acceptable to the parties.3"9 In this
way, the risk of bias will be minimized.
VI. CONCLUSION
"These are critical times in our nations. With the search for
alternative fuel sources in order to gain energy independence, the
need for cutting-edge innovation has never been greater."3 ' Thus,
rather than undermining the patent system with an ineffective,
allegedly bright line rule, courts should focus on insuring the
issuance of quality patents. The patent system should retain its
flexibility to exclude "bad inventions," in particular software-
related inventions that are likely to impede subsequent innovation,
to be too trivial or to be afforded too much protection.
As this article demonstrated, "by holding on to one-fits-all
notions of invention"31' the patent system ignores the unique
306. Id.
307. H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
308. Cecil & Willging, supra note 284, at 544.
309. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, supra note 298, § 11.51.
310. Harkins, supra note 42, at 733.
311. Biagioli, supra note 273.
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characteristics of software patents. Indeed, Bilski's "machine-or-
transformation" test fails to address the unique traits of software
inventions, which on the one hand, can be easily tied to a
particular machine, i.e. ROM, and on the other hand, can be easily
construed to transform data that represents physical things, i.e.
human actions.
Therefore, this article proposed a special examination procedure
that is adapted to their unique traits. Indeed, "at this juncture,
when neither Congress nor the U.S. Supreme Court is certain to
enact patent reform, changing the administrative practices of the
agency responsible for implementing patent law may be the best
opportunity... to effect reform."3 2
The proposed solution builds on the aid of external experts in
determining patentability of software inventions under section 101,
during both the examination process at the Patent Office and the
judicial review process. This is not a perfect solution. The
proposed advisory committee has to be selected, vetted, and
approved, and disputes can arise over membership." 3 Conflicts of
interest must be identified and resolved and experts must be
convinced to join.31 4 Additionally, appointing software experts as
advisors during the judicial phase represents a striking departure
from the adversarial process.3"5
Nonetheless, between Bilski's allegedly bright line rule, which
seeks to exclude many of the kinds of inventions that apply today's
electronic and photonic technologies,316 and an undefined, "I know
it when I see it"3 '7 criteria, which relies solely on the exclusion of
three vague judicial exceptions, the proposed solution is the lesser
of three evils. Therefore, the Supreme Court should overrule the
Federal Circuit's attempt to define a rigid "bright line" test,318 and
instead adopt the examination procedure this article has proposed.
312. Noveck, supra note 245, at 128
313. Id. at 142.
314. Id.
315. Cecil & Willging, supra note 284, at 540.
316. Bilski, 545 F.3d at 976 (Newman, J., dissenting).
317. Justice Potter Stewart used this phrase to describe the threshold of
obscenity in Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964).
318. Id.
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